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This paper is a brief for the introduction of a
subsidy to any qualified firm for its use of
low-wage employees as a means to reduce the
unemployment and raise the pay of
disadvantaged workers. There would be a case
for such a wage subsidy in all the advanced
market economies, and certainly the American
one, regardless of recent trends. The case has
grown stronger, however, with the worsening of
the relative wages and especially the
unemployment rates of low-age workers. The
globalization of investment and the bias of
technical progress are the causes most often
suggested. I would add the growth of the
welfare system—the public entitlements to
hospitalization, to retirement and disability
insurance, and to the benefits labeled "welfare"
in the narrow sense. Since this factor tends to be
overlooked, I devote Section I to it. Section II
proceeds to the case for a low-wage
employment subsidy. It will be clear that the
beneficial effects of the subsidy on
disadvantaged workers are the mirror opposite
of the harmful side effects of the welfare
system, side effects that the subsidy would
counteract.
**Discussants:  David Colander, Middlebury College;
Alan Krueger, Princeton University.
*Departments of Economics, Columbia University New
York, NY 10027.
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I. Side Effects of the Welfare
The welfare system harms disadvantaged
workers through its impacts on the availability
of jobs, on the overall reward from work, and on
the morale of disadvantaged communities. On
the unemployment impacts, my multivariate
study of the postwar OECD economies, with
Gylfi Zoega, found that the payroll tax is a
powerful determinant of the natural
unemployment rate. Its rise, much of it to
finance welfare spending, is a major source of
the increase in the natural rate from the 1960's to
recent years (Phelps, 1994). The steeper rise of
this tax in Europe than in the United States helps
to explain the far larger rise of the natural rate
there.
Underpinning this study is the incentive-wage
(efficiency-wage) theory of the natural rate. In
that theory, if the economy finds itself with zero
involuntary unemployment, firms' hiring having
been buoyed by wages low enough to clear the
market, employee quit rates and consequent
training costs will be so high that every firm will
see it as cost-effective to raise its pay, putting it
above the industry standard, in the expectation
of achieving lower labor turnover—to pay the
optimal  incentive wage  corresponding to the
unemployment rate. The consequent escalation
of the pay standard means that merely  paying
the going wage would cost more than before,
with the result that all firms cut back hiring. The
downsizing must go on until the unemployment
rate has risen to its natural level, where
involuntary unemployment is just high enough
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(cost-effective) incentive wage to the level of
the demand wage, the wage firms can afford to
pay if they are to maintain current employment
rolls. In the proto-models, though, taxes were
neutral for the natural rate (Phelps, 1968; Steven
Salop, 1979).
My new work emphasizes that employees'
average propensity to quit (and also to shirk, to
be an absentee, etc.) is a function not only of the
unemployment rate and their relative wage, as
before, but also of the ratio of their wage (or of
the standard wage) to their average nonwage
income, income from wealth plus net transfers.
Workers' nonwage income, or unearned income
and that of family and friends bolsters their
willingness to quit (also, to shirk, etc.), at the
risk of losing their jobs. In this asset-enriched
model,  a payroll tax is not neutral: it has a
negative impact on the demand wage (by adding
to firms' costs), but less so on the required
incentive wage (since it does not tax away any
nonwage income). Both the wage and
employment fall, unemployment rising to a new
and higher natural level.
This enriched model, if extended to
heterogeneous workers, would show
unemployment to fall primarily on the
disadvantaged, since the more skilled workers
may land a lesser job when waiting for an
opening in their normal work, while the
unskilled have no such alternative.
There is another channel through which the
welfare state has aggravated joblessness.
Richard Layard and Stephen Nickell put the
harm done by unemployment compensation into
their model and estimated its effects (Layard et
al., 1991). But like all pioneers, they did not go
half far enough. As Zoega argued, the safety net
(food stamps, medicaid, etc.) has a sort of
wealth effect alongside the substitution effect
from the payroll taxes to finance them: it
increases the willingness of workers to take
risks that might cost them their jobs. Quitting
for a change of scene, shirking, and the like
become more tempting. Hence, the required
incentive wage is pushed up (and in some cases
the demand wage is pulled down), with obvious
consequences for the natural rate (Zoega, 1993;
Phelps, 1994).
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The overall reward to the disadvantaged from
employment may also be hurt: their wages must
drop to finance their participation in a welfare
system that they would not have been willing to
buy, being too poor. The wealth effect of the
system, in elevating quit rates, also operates to
reduce employees' net productivity (net of
training costs) and thus to reduce the demand
wage on this account as well. So the welfare
state may reduce the wages of the disadvantaged
by more than would just compensate for the
imposed welfare entitlements.
There are also effects on self-esteem: with the
safety net only inches below, many of the
disadvantaged will see employment as far less
rewarding in utility terms, and hence
emotionally. When people do not need
employment to have housing, food, and even to
raise children, the meager pecuniary reward of
the low-end jobs is devalued. The effect must be
a decline in many people's morale. The reduced
morale impairs their job performance, which in
turn costs them some opportunities and reduces
the profitability of investing in themselves to
improve their future opportunities. The weak
morale is contagious in a close-knit community.
All this damage done to disadvantaged
workers might not matter much if disadvantaged
workers were all fairly and handsomely
rewarded in the workplace. In fact, though, the
very disadvantaged—say, the bottom tenth—
continue to do badly in the advanced economies,
with unemployment rates that are extremely
high, especially among the young, and with
wage rates that are little above the meager wage
minimum instituted by law or by trade unions.
In the United States, the earnings of workers at
the tenth percentile in the distribution of earned
income in 1986 were only 35 percent of the
earnings of median workers (Peter Gottschalk
and Mary Joyce, 1992 table 2).
Has the relative wage and the relative
unemployment rate of very disadvantaged
workers deteriorated as my analysis suggests?
The position of disadvantaged males has
declined noticeably since the end of the 1960's,
and this despite the increased numbers of
complementary workers having more education.
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much of this deterioration is the effect of the
welfare state and how much the effect of other
factors (e.g., technological change and
developments overseas). Though the welfare
state may not be the main culprit, it may be
making a worsening situation still worse.
II. The Argument for Low-Wage
Employment Subsidies
My theme is not mainly the familiar call for
reviving the "stick," axing social programs that
draw the disadvantaged from job-seeking into
rent-seeking. It is more a call for fortifying the
"carrot": for creating institutions to enlist the
self-help of the disadvantaged by raising the
reward to their initiative and perseverance in
gaining employment. I have proposed for some
time that a system of low-wage employment
subsidies  be introduced, a subsidy to every
qualifying firm based on the stock of low-wage
workers on its rolls, in order to pull up the wage
rates and employment rates of all very
disadvantaged workers (Phelps, 1985, 1990).
My thesis here is that, in stimulating the
demand for low-wage labor, low-wage
employment subsidies would yield a social
benefit exceeding the purely private benefit.
Social "externalities" would flow through three
channels, which I will briefly take up.
Equity.—Almost nowhere in the
moral-philosophic literature is it deemed just
that those with only a limited kind of labor input
to offer should receive only its reward in
classical competitive general equilibrium— its
marginal product--no matter how low. (Imagine
that unskilled labor were so abundant its
marginal product was zero!) In many views
about fairness in the rewards to workers from
their cooperation in the economy, from a
utilitarian view to the diverse views of the
present, economic justice requires the more
advantaged to provide a subsidy, financed by a
tax on their own income, to the disadvantaged;
its function is to allocate to the disadvantaged an
increased portion of the gain resulting from the
social cooperation—to give them a fairer shake.
In some conceptions of justice, the more
fortunate
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will not want to profit from economic
cooperation if it would be at the expense of the
less fortunate. Ayn Rand (1964) offers the
image of the bus in which the less fortunate are
given a free ride. The more fortunate pass up
any share of the gain from cooperation, content
with the same benefit net of cost obtainable
without cooperation. In John Rawls's (1971)
world of collaborative production, though, any
effort by the more advantaged to rebate through
the tax/subsidy mechanism the whole of their
gain from the collaboration back to the less
advantaged might be counterproductive: both
groups might be better off lowering tax rates,
accepting the resulting increase of inequality in
return for the improved incentives to work more
cost-effectively. In Rawls's theory of justice the
more advantaged would tax themselves to make
the gain to the disadvantaged as large as
possible, no matter that there is a greater gain in
it for themselves, since it is not at the expense of
the disadvantaged.
A less uncompromising moral observer than
Rawls would be satisfied to see a large step
taken toward that reference point: some subsidy,
but not one lifting the bottom wage rate as far as
it can be made to go. Certainly a subsidy simply
to avert burdening low-wage employment with
the financing of various social-insurance
programs financed by payroll taxes would seem
minimal. If a person not in the labor force and
with no visible means of supporting himself is
deemed to have a right to social health insurance
free of charge, then it would not seem right to
require a person of little productivity to pay the
whole cost of his or her insurance, especially
when that insurance is mandatory and would not
have been bought by poor workers.
Where is the externality here? Why are taxes
and subsidies needed to achieve people's notions
of what is less unjust (however incomplete they
may be}? One might think that individual
economic actors could implement these
principles themselves in the way they draw up
contracts for compensation among themselves.
The answer is that when an individual—a
"producer," we may call him—is contemplating
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which he collaborates with another less
advantaged than himself, he knows that greater
self-restraint on his own part does not translate
into a similar restraint binding everyone else in
his position, a side effect that would have
appealed to his sense of justice. Because his
unilateral action does not have that external
benefit, he restrains himself less than he would if
it did, and the same is true of the others. Hence,
people are glad to be able to vote the
tax/subsidies necessary to yield a general
scale-back in the after-tax reward to the
advantaged for the sake of a general pulling up
of the after-subsidy reward of the disadvantaged
(see Amartya Sen,1961).
     Unemployment  and  Waste  of  Resources.—
The failure of society to arrange better pay for
those with the poorest skills and commercial
background largely accounts for the
extraordinary unemployment among
disadvantaged workers. In the efficiency-wage
theory of involuntary unemployment,
summarized earlier, considerations of employee
incentives drive wages above market-clearing
levels and thus create an equilibrium volume (or
path) of involuntary unemployment. As noted,
the unemployment is widest among the most
disadvantaged, in pyramid fashion. In a society
rich enough to put up a safety net, the
widespread availability of welfare entitlements
and access to those of family and partners
undermines the interest of the disadvantaged in
careful and sustained performance at work, and
this diminished attachment to jobholding
ultimately increases the shortage of jobs.
This unemployment results in some resource
waste. Up to a point, measures operating to
raise the employment of the disadvantaged by
raising the demand for their services could
generate enough tax revenue and savings in
welfare entitlements (at fixed tax and
entitlement rates) to pay for the wage subsidies.
Some subsidy could be justified purely on
efficiency grounds. The catch is that those who
would have to finance it are already facing high
tax rates to finance the welfare state and various
public expenditures such as national defense.
Hence,
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there is a first-order efficiency loss from still
higher tax rates to be weighed in the balance.
   Community  Effects.—In several ways the
dismal wage rates of very disadvantaged
workers and the acute shortage of jobs attack the
vitality of the whole economy. The relatively
very low wages and shortfall of jobs available to
the more disadvantaged workers push the more
susceptible of them into intermittent criminal
opportunities, which are much more plentiful
and vastly better paying. For example, the
supply of illicit drugs is thus stimulated, which
operates to turn on a demand. The result is harm
to others—external diseconomies. A subsidy to
increase the demand for disadvantaged labor in
legitimate enterprises would be a valuable step
in the opposite direction.
The plight of very disadvantaged workers also
operates to undermine the performance and
initiative of others. When parents and older
relatives are frequently unemployed, and hence
often dependent on welfare, a child is not
provided with the role models from which to
acquire the habits of initiative and responsibility
needed for realizing his or her potential in
legitimate business. A culture of passivity may
thus develop. Also, some disadvantaged workers,
lacking access to most business enterprises, must
feel cut off from the economic mainstream, so a
culture of alienation may also develop.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, to be very
disadvantaged in a society rich enough to put up a
comfortable safety net means that there is rather
little distance between the outcome one can hope
for by knocking oneself out and the average
expectation for other people in the same situation;
so a sense of powerlessness—little power to do
better—must overtake many of the
disadvantaged. Drug use is intensified, and the
addiction induces the user to turn into a supplier
recruiting new addicts to support the addiction.
This surrender to alternative life styles spawns
inappropriate role models, making it more
difficult for children, and even friends if exposed
on all sides, to stay clear of these pursuits. Thus a58 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 1994
culture of criminality may result as well. Then
incidents of violence become common. As the
bleak prospects of the disadvantaged reduces
what they are willing to pay for their own lives,
it also reduces the value they place on others'
lives as well. It would be surprising if some of
the disadvantaged, feeling they were being
shown a lack of respect by society, did not seek
"respect" through the use of guns.
If for no other reason than these external
diseconomies, thus sheer self-preservation, we
all have an interest in collective action to
improve the opportunities for disadvantaged
workers.
III. Concluding Remarks
There exist, in reality or on paper, several
kinds of low-wage subsidy schemes (see Robert
H. Haveman and John L. Palmer, 1982). The
American scheme in place is the earned-income
tax credit. Its drawback is that, in increasing
labor supply, it lowers the wage paid by
employers, which is costly to those not covered
by the program (workers without children),
many of them just as disadvantaged, and of
symbolic importance even to those in the
program.
Some other proposed schemes each offer a
category of workers (recipients of an
unemployment benefit or other welfare benefit)
the right to exchange it at a firm in return for a
job. These categorical schemes have the
drawback that they privilege some persons (the
unemployed or welfare recipients) in the
competition for jobs at the expense of others
with no less a moral claim.
A more equitable and no less feasible scheme
is a graduated subsidy based on the wage paid
to all employees, new and old alike, in all
categories. It would entail a large budgetary
outlay. But the savings in welfare outlays,
unemployment benefits, crime-fighting, and the
increased tax revenues flowing in might
counterbalance the budget.
In the meantime, it would be a natural step to
institute budgetization, or fiscalization, of all or
most of the payroll taxes paid
by employers on their low-wage workers, as the
French are talking of doing. Such a step would
at once increase the demand for such workers,
lowering their unemployment rates and lifting
their wage rates.
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